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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state court and most defendants prefer
to litigate in federal court. Their reasons are personal, practical, and tactical,'

*Copyright 2001. All rights reserved.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A., 1969,
Brooklyn College of the City University ofNew York; J.D., 1972, Rutgers University School of
Law-Camden.
The author wishes to thank Joe Brewer and Todd Hagins of the Class of 2001, and Chris
Colwell, a second-year student, at the University of South Carolina School of Law, for valuable
research assistance inpreparing this Article. My colleagues, James F. Flanagan (forsubstance) and
Thomas R. Haggard (for style), provided invaluable assistance in working out the proposed
revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
1. These preferences vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, case to case, and lawyer to
lawyer. First, plaintiffs' lawyers generally are more familiar with procedure and are more
comfortable in state court. Second, federal courts are more likely to grant summary judgment to
defendants. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,327 (1986) (stating that summary
judgmentis not adisfavoredprocedural shortcut); Andersonv.LibertyLobby, Inc.,477U.S. 242,
250 (1986) (agreeing that the standard for summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict
standard); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1986)
(finding that the absence ofa motive to price fix is relevant to summaryjudgment's genuine-issue185
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and, based on recent scholarly research, also empirical.' These preferences are
brought into sharp conflict when a plaintiff files a civil action in state court that

for-trial standard). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (allowing defending party to move for summary
judgment) with J. Palmer Lockard, Summary Judgment in Pennsylvania: TimeforAnother Look
at Credibility,35 DuQ.L.REv. 625,654 (1997) (discussing how Pennsylvania summaryjudgment
standards are more stringent than federal standards). Apart from the Court's enthusiastic

endorsement, summary judgment is more common in federal court for a more practical reason.
Federal judges are assigned individual cases when they are originally filed in or removed to a

federal court. Consequently, if the judge grants summary judgment, the case disappears from the
judge's docket. With few exceptions, state court cases in contrast, are assigned to individual
judges only when ready for trial. Hearing an application for summary judgment in a general
motions part, a state judge has little personal incentive to grant the motion, which requires a
written opinion subject to immediate appellate review, because some other judge will likely be
assigned to try the case later if the motion is denied. Third, federal courts are more likely to
bifurcate a trial into liability and damages phases, which tends to increase the plaintiff's burden
and which favors the defendant, especially in products liability and medical malpractice litigation.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (permitting separate trial on any individual issue for convenience,
economy, expedition, or to avoid prejudice). Fourth, federal judges strictly supervise pretrial
preparation, including rigorously enforcing deadlines to complete discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
P. 16 (providing for extensive scheduling and management ofpretrial process). Fifth, defendants'
lawyers perceive increased neutrality and competence in federal judges, especially in diversity
cases brought against nonresident corporate defendants and in federal question cases generally.
See LARRY W. YACKIE, FEDERAL COURTS 23-26 (1999) (summarizing the views of major
commentators on both sides ofthe parity debate); Thomas B. Marvell, The RationalesforFederal
QuestionJurisdiction:An EmpiricalExaminationofStudent Rights Litigation, Wis.L.REv. 1315,
1356-58 (1984) (asserting that litigants choose to litigate in federal court because they perceive
federal judges to be more knowledgeable about federal law and more sympathetic to federallycreated rights); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1115-30 (1977)
(presenting structural arguments for the superiority of federal courts).
2. An enormous volume of litigation is devoted to removal issues because of the perceived
litigation advantages of a particular forum. These perceptions are buttressed by recent empirical
research establishing that defendants win a substantially higher percentage of cases removed to
federal court as opposed to cases initially filed in federal court. Although the study did not contrast
outcomes on removal with outcomes of similar cases tried in state courts, logic suggests that
plaintiffs prefer state courts because they have a better chance of prevailing there. This recent
empirical research by Professors Clermont and Eisenberg concluded:
Removal of civil cases from state to federal court results in a precipitous
drop in the plaintiffs' win rate. As we have previously reported, the overall
win rate in federal civil cases is 57.97%, but in the subset ofthose cases that
have been removedthewin rateis only36.77%. Apparently, the defendants'
ability to choose the forum greatly augments their odds of success.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,Do CaseOutcomesReallyRevealAnythingAboutthe
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 593 (1998)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thesepercentages arebased on 1979-1991 data, and "newer
data... indicate a 53% win rate in all original cases and a 33% win rate in all removed cases." Id.
at 593 n.42.
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could have instead been filed in federal court.3 The defendant against whom the
action is brought may remove4 the case and have it tried in federal court.5
Although not mentioned in the Constitution,6 the First Congress provided
for removal jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789,7 and the procedure, with
various modifications, has been part of federal practice since that time.8 The
structure of the current statute dates from the 1948 version of the Judicial
Code.9 Because the general removal statute is jurisdictional, courts strictly

3. Only cases that could originally have been filed in a federal court can be removed. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 5.5, at 340-41 (3d ed.
1999); CHARLESALANWRIGHT&MARYKAYKANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38, at 226 (6th

ed. 2002).
4. Only defendants may remove. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) ("[A]ny civil action... may
be removedby the defendant or defendants."); Shamrock Oil& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
108 (1941). However, defendants sued on a state law claim in their home states by a nonresident
plaintiff, may not remove. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994).
5. Removal is only permitted "to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). While
Congress appropriately limited removal to the specific federal district court embracing the
geographic location of the pending state court action, remand is not similarly limited. There are
very simple and compelling reasons for this distinction. If removal were not geographically
limited, a defendantcould improperly remove a case directly to ajudicial districthundreds or even
thousands ofmiles away from the location of the state court where the action was filed, and thus
cause a plaintiff unreasonable burden and expense in moving to remand. On the other hand,
remand cannot be geographically limited because a case may be improperly removed and
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) before a jurisdictional defect is discovered.
Whenever ajurisdictional defect is discovered, a federal court wherever located must remand or
dismiss a removed case. See id. § 1447(c). Ifthe initial removal court transfers the case without
first deciding a remand motion and the initial removal is improper, the § 1404(a) transferee court
must remand the case to the state court from which it was initially removed, regardless ofwhether
that state court is located thousands of miles away.
Not geographically limiting remand is appropriate even if the initial removal is proper
because subsequent litigation developments may leave claims lacking any independent basis for
federal jurisdiction in federal court. For example, if a federal question and supplemental state
claims are properly removed from a state court, and the federal question is dismissed or
compromised, the federal court would ordinarily remand the state claims. See, e.g., CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) (reasoning that a court may remand rather than
dismiss pendent state law claims if federally sufficient claim is discontinued); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that a court has discretion to dismiss
nondiversity state claims if the federal question is dismissed before trial); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(1994) (providing factors to consider in exercising discretionary jurisdiction over supplemental
claims).
6. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 339; 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRAcncE § 107.03, at20 (3d ed. 1997).
7. JudiciaryAct of 1789, ch. 20, § 12,1 Stat. 73 (providing forremovalby alien defendants,
by out-of-state citizens, and in certain land grant cases involving more than $500).
8. 14B CHARLES ALANWRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721, at 28890 (3d ed. 1998).
9. See generally 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, § 107App. (containing the complete
legislative history of the removal statute since 1948).
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construe and enforce it.'" Although the timing provisions of § 1446(b) are not
jurisdictional, courts also strictly enforce these provisions because removal of
a case properly pending in a state court raises federalism concerns." Removal
jurisdiction has spawned more litigation and contains more pitfalls for a litigant
than almost any other area of federal practice. 2
The timing provision of the removal statute has been the subject of much
of this litigation and the source of one of the statute's principal pitfalls. In
relevant part, it provides that a defendant must remove a case by filing a notice
of removal
within thirty days after the receiptby the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
forth the claim for relief.., or within thirty days after the
service of the summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be
served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 3

10. The removal statute incorporates general subject-matter jurisdictional limitations by
permitting removal ofcases falling only within the original jurisdiction ofthe federal courts. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). Indeed, there is a presumption that a "court lacks jurisdiction in a
particular case until it has been demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists."
WRIGHT & KANE, supranote 3, § 7, at 27 (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8
(1799)).
I1. See, e.g., Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 784-86 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that because
untimely removal is a procedural defect and not ajurisdictional one, a motion to remand based on
untimely removal must be filed within thirty days after the case is removed); In re Pfohl Bros.
Landfill Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that because removal raises
federalism issues, "removal statutes are narrowly construed and doubts are resolved against
removal"); Staino v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., No. 98 Civ. 8514 (SAS), 1999 WL 102757, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1999) ("[T]he court must construe the thirty-day period narrowly, resolving
any doubts against removability."); 1015 Half Street Corp. v. Warehouse Concepts, Inc., No. Civ.
A. 99-1174SSH, 1999 WL 1212885, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1999) ("[T]he basis of plaintiff's
motion... is untimeliness, not lack of subject matterjurisdiction."); Rosebud Holding, L.L.C. v.
Burks, 995 F. Supp. 465,467 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that the thirty-day period is notjurisdictional
but may not be extended). See generally 16 MOORE ETAL., supranote 6, § 107.05, at 24 (stating
that federal courts generally construe the statute to restrict removal);14B WRIGHT ETAL., supra
note 8, § 3721, at 340-51 & n.1 10 ("[T]here is ample case support... for the proposition that
removal statutes will be strictly construed.").
Structurally, removal does not impact federalism any more than do cases originally filed in
federal court. Federalism is manifestly implicated when a defendant in a properly pending state
courtproceeding files an action in federal court against the state courtplaintiff. Anyreliefawarded
by a federal court in this circumstance may, and is usually intended by the federal plaintiff to,
interfere with the ongoing state court proceeding. For discussion of federalism concerns when a
federal court is asked to interfere with a previously filed, properly pending state proceeding, see
Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a CivilMaturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
57 FORDHAM L. Rv. 997 (1989).
12. Carol E. Heckman, Removal Jurisdiction:A Trapfor the Unwary, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11,
2000, at 1.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Conflicting interpretations of this provision by lower federal courts have
occurred in at least four circumstances. First, when a defendant receives a
courtesy copy of a complaint before formal service of process, is the thirty-day
period triggered by the earlierreceipt of a copy of the complaint, orby the later
service of process? 4 The Supreme Court resolved this issue in favor of service
of process in Murphy Brothers,Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,Inc.'" Second,
when service of process is made on a statutory agent 6 instead of the named
defendant, does the thirty-day period commence with the earlier service on the
statutory agent or with the later receipt by the named defendant? 7 Third, when
a defendant inNew York is served with a summons with notice of claim in lieu
of complaint"8 and demands service of the complaint, 9 does the thirty-day
period commence with the earlier service ofthe summons with notice of claim
or with the later service and receipt of the actual complaint?"° Fourth, if more
than one defendant is named in an action or proceeding, does the thirty-day
period run separately for each defendant or concurrently for all defendants,
and, if concurrently, does it commence with the first or last served defendant?"'
This Article analyzes each of these circumstances in which the removal
timing provision has been subject to conflicting interpretations and suggests
amendments to § 1446(b) to resolve the conflict. Part H describes the courtesy
copy removal trap and its resolution by Murphy Brothers.Part HI focuses on
the three other removal timing problems and analyzes whether dicta in Murphy
Brothers provides sufficient guidance to the lower federal courts to resolve
these problems. Part Il concludes that legislative modification of § 1446 is
necessary. The centerpiece of the Article, Part IV, proposes an amendment to
§ 1446, codifying the holding and dicta in Murphy Brothers, and expressly
addressing the other timing problems. Although adopting this proposal is not
likely to end all § 1446(b) litigation, its adoption would substantially improve
current practice.

14. See infra Part II.A-B.
15. 526 U.S. 344 (1999). For recent student commentary onMurphyBrothers,see D. Troy
Blair, Recent Decisions, Receipt of a Complaint, Priorto or Unattendedby FormalService of
Process,Does Not TriggeraDefendant'sThirty-DayPeriodto Remove a Case: Murphy Brothers,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 38 DUQ.L.REv. 663 (2000); Jerry Meade, Note, Death ofthe
ReceiptRule: Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 39 BRANDEIsL.J. 493 (20002001); Jennifer N. Moore, Note, Resolving the Conflict Betveen Receipt and ProperService:
Murphy Brothers v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 51 MERCER L. REv. 775 (2000); Barbara A.
Wiseman, Comment, Applying Murphy Brothers v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. to Removal in
Multiple Defendant Lawsuits, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2000).
16. SeegenerallyBLACK'SLADICrIONARY 65(7th ed. 1999) ("An agent designated by
law to receive litigation documents and other legal notices for a nonresident corporation. In most
states, the secretary of state is the statutory agent for such corporations.").
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 305(b) (McKinney 2001).
19. See id. 3012(b).
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra PartIII.C.
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II. MURPHYBROTHERS SHUTS THE "COURTESY" COPY REMOVAL TRAP
A. The "Courtesy" Copy Removal Trap
Prior to Murphy Brothers the lower federal courts' and commentators'
were deeply divided over whether the 1446(b) clock could start before formal
service of process. The statute requires removal "within thirty days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading." 4 It appears to start the removal clock from receipt of the complaint
even in the absence of formal service of process, which is necessary for a court
to properly assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant.' Recognizing this
point, lawyers representing plaintiffs, who instinctively prefer litigating in state
court,26 devised a scheme to impede defendants from timely exercising their
right to remove.
After filing an action in a state court, the plaintiff would furnish to the
defendant, by facsimile or other means not constituting formal service, a
courtesy copy of the complaint. A suggestion that the parties attempt to resolve
the dispute, and a warning that defendant would be served with formal process
if settlement could not be reached, frequently accompanied the courtesy
complaint. This tactic lulled the defendant into a false sense of security that no
immediate action was required. 7 If settlement discussions broke down, or in
the absence of any discussions, the plaintiff then served formal process on the
defendant. Typically, the defendant then retained counsel, who promptly filed
a removal notice. If the notice was filed more than thirty days after receipt of
the courtesy copy of the complaint, the plaintiff argued that the removal was
untimely because the clock started on receipt of the courtesy copy, and not
when service of process transpired.
For at least ten years before the Supreme Court put a stop to this tactic,
every court of appeals28 and many district courts29 that considered the issue
22. See infra notes 28 & 29.
23. CompareRobert P. Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap: Untimely Removal From State
to FederalCourt,52 MD. L. REV. 374 (1993) (advocating the receipt rule), with Donna Rohwer,
Comment, The Forty-YearDispute: What Triggers the Start ofthe Removal Period Under 28
US.C. Section 1446(b)?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 359 (1992) (advocating a service rule).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
25. For discussion of personal jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause, see Howard B.
Stravitz, Sayonarato Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C.
L. REv. 729,731-83 (1988); see also Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace:
SomethingMore is Required on the ElectronicStream ofCommerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925 (1998)
(discussing personal jurisdiction based on internet contacts).
26. See supra notes 1-2.
27. See, e.g., White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d 890. 891-92 (W.D. La. 1998) (providing a
classic example of this tactic; defendant in receipt of letter stated in an affidavit that "the tone of
the letter caused him to believe that he did not yet need a lawyer").
28. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros., Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir.
1997), rev'd,526 U.S. 344 (1999) (citing Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 841 (5th
Cir. 1996); Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1994); and Tech Hills II Assocs. v.
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adopted the "receipt" rule. Although the reasoning of these courts varied, three
main arguments emerged to support the rule. First, the language of the statute
appears unambiguous." Its key phrase, "receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise,"3' plainly makes receipt, not proper service, the triggering
event.32 Viewed in a vacuum devoid of legislative history, the receipt rule
appeared correct.
Second, part of § 1446(b)'s legislative history favored the receipt rule
because Congress intended to establish a uniform federal standard for removal
independent of state law.33 Prior to 1948, removal wholly depended on state
procedure because a defendant could remove only up until the time when state
law required the filing of a responsive pleading.34 In 1948, Congress adopted
a uniform time period from a single triggering event.35 Removal was permitted
within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of process.3 6
Within one year, Congress again amended the statute essentially to its current
form, because New York permitted service of process by summons alone
without a complaint.37 A New York defendant served with a summons could
Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1993) as previous courts ofappeals'
decisions).
29. See, e.g., Boyles v. Junction CityFoundry, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1246,1249 (D. Kan. 1997)
(receipt rule); Joiner v. Kaywal Transp., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 1252,1254 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (same);
Spielman v. Standard Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Colegio de
IngenierosyAgrimensores de Puerto Rico v. CNE Consulting, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 241,243 (D.P.R.
1995) (same); Greensmith Co. v. COM Sys. Inc., 796 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D.N.J. 1992) (same);
Gates Constr. Corp. v. Koschak, 792 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Tyler v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (same). But see Bowman
v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329,333, 343 (D.S.C. 1996) (service rule); Bullard v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (same); Apache Nitrogen Prods., Inc.
v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 674,680 (D. Ariz. 1993) (same); Estate ofBaratt v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 787 F. Supp. 333,336-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Hill v. City of Boston, 706 F.
Supp. 966,968 (D. Mass. 1989) (same); Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65,
68 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (same).
30. See, e.g., Tech Hills IlAssocs., 5 F.3d at 968 ("The flaw in [theLove] line of reasoning
is that it ignores the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.") (alteration in original)
(citation omitted); Respondent's Brief at 4-8, Murphy Bros., Inc.v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,
526 U.S. 344 (1999) (No. 97-1909).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Roe, 38 F.3d at 303 ("Via the 'or otherwise' language, § 1446(b) starts the
clock with actual receipt.").
33. See, e.g.,MichettiPipeStringing,Inc., 125 F.3d at 1398 ("To homogenizepractice from
state to state, in 1948 Congress... add[ed] a twenty-day (later thirty) deadline."), rev'd, 526 U.S.
344 (1999)(footnote omitted); Tech Hills IlAssocs., 5 F.3d at 967-68 ("The purpose of the 1949
amendmentwas to promote national uniformity in the triggering ofthe removal period by relying
on receipt of the initial pleading instead of formal service of process, which varied from state to
state.") (citations omitted); Respondent's Brief at 11, Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 344 (1999)
(No. 97-1909) ("Congress chose language that 'will meet the varying conditions ofpractice in all
the States."') (citations omitted).
34. See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, § 107 App.01 [2], at 8.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 3 (reprinting the original version of§ 1446(b)).
37. Id. § 107App.02[2], at 12.
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demand later service of the complaint, which, under the 1948 statute, might not
occur until after the running of the removal period triggered by the summons.38
As one court noted, the 1949 "receipt... through service or otherwise,"3 9
language was necessary to avoid the removal clock's running "before the
complaint landed in the defendant's hands."' Adopting the receipt rule, the
Eleventh Circuit viewed this legislative history as putting all defendants "on
the same footing as those in New York: they have thirty days to remove after
they see the filed complaint."'" Apart from uniformity, other courts read the
legislative history to require promptness and efficiency in removal, which in
their view could only be achieved by the receipt rule.42
Third, the receipt rule courts relied on the general axiom that removal
statutes are to be construed strictly, narrowly, and when there is any doubt
about their proper application, against removal.43
B. Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.
Joining three other circuits" and several district courts,45 the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a receipt rule for section 1446(b). When a named defendant
receives a faxed copy of a filed complaint, the thirty-day removal period begins
to run, even if the defendant has not been served with process." Reversing the
Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "a named defendant's time to
remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or
receipt of the complaint, 'through service or otherwise,' after and apart from
service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended
by any formal service."'47
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Ginsburg supported the holding with
four rationales. First, service of process is traditionally "fundamental to any

38. See Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 351.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
40. MichettiPipeStringing,Inc., 125 F.3d at 1399, rev'd, 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (emphasis

omitted).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Reece v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"the receipt rule is consistent with 'Congress' intent to resolve swiffly removal issues."').
43. See, e.g., Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that
"[w]hatever (slight) ambiguity § 1446(b) poses in application to an ordinary case... may be
resolved by the principle that doubts should be resolved against removal.") (citing Shamrock Oil
& Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,108-09 (1941) and Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,270 (1934));
Tech Hills II Assocs. v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963,968 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the receipt "rule is consistent with the longstanding principle that the removal statutes are to
be construed strictly, narrowly and against removal").
44. See supranote 28.
45. See supra note 29.
46. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros., Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398-99 (1 1th Cir.
1997), rev'd 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
47. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999).
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procedural imposition on a named defendant."" A court may not ordinarily
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant named in a complaint without
service of process.49 Consequently, a named defendant's procedural and
substantive rights may not be affected in the absence of "service of a summons
or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party
served must appear and defend.""0
Second, the legislative history of § 1446(b) provides no support for the
proposition that Congress "intended to dispense with the historic function of
service of process as the official trigger for responsive action by an individual
or entity named [as a] defendant."" Filing a removal notice plainly constitutes
"responsive action" implicating a defendant's procedural right to have a case
tried in a federal court as opposed to a state court. The Court found that the
purpose of the pertinent language "receipt ... through service or otherwise,"
was specifically to address the unique procedural system found inNew York. 2
At that time an action could be commenced in New York by the mere service
of a summons without a complaint or any other document stating the nature of
the claim against, or the relief sought from, the defendant.5 3 Moreover, the
complaint was not required to be filed in court within a specified period of
time.54 Under the 1948 version of § 1446(b), a case had to be removed "within
twenty days after commencement of the action or service ofprocess, whichever
is later."55 Since the service of the summons constituted both commencement
of the action and service of process, the removal period might expire before a
New York defendant received-through further service or otherwise-a copy
of the complaint.5 6 Without the complaint a defendant could not determine if
the case was removable.
Third, the Court disparagingly rejected the Eleventh Circuit's view that
§ 1446(b) was unambiguous.5 7 The Eleventh Circuit stated that "the phrase
'through service or otherwise' opens a universe of means besides service for
putting the defendant in possession of the complaint."" Justice Ginsburg's
opinion queried: "What are the dimensions of that 'universe?' 5. 9 Finding that

the words "or otherwise" fail to answer that question, she concluded that "[t]he

48. Id. at 350.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 353.
52. See id. at 351-52.
53. See Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 351.
54. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1948), reprinted in 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 107App.01[1], at3.
56. See Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 351.
57. See id. at 353-54.
58. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros., Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11 th Cir.
1997), rev'd,526 U.S. 344 (1999).
59. Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 353.
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Eleventh Circuit's opinion is uninformative."6 She buttressed this conclusion
with the deceptively simple, but incisive view of one district judge, who wrote
that "[i]f in fact the words 'service or otherwise' had a plain meaning, the cases
would not be so hopelessly split over their proper interpretation."6
The Court found additional support for rejecting a plain meaning approach
in the Seventh Circuit's inconsistent interpretation of that same language in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c).62 When a case is removed before an
answer is submitted, Rule 8 1(c) requires an answer within twenty days "after
receipt through service or otherwise" of the complaint, or twenty days after
service of a summons on a previously filed complaint, or five days after
removal, "whichever period is longest."63 Affirming the district court's refusal
to enter a default judgment against a removing defendant not properly served
with process, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 81(c) does not require an
answer in the absence of proper service of process, even if identical language
in § 1446(b) compels a similarly situated defendant to remove on mere receipt
of a complaint.' Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg cogently concluded that the
Seventh Circuit's conflicting reading of the same "receipt through service or
otherwise" language in Rule 81(c) and § 1446(b) "undercuts the.., position
that the phrase has an inevitably 'plain meaning. '65
Finally, the Court expressed concern that foreign defendants might be
substantially disadvantaged by the receipt rule, because a copy of a complaint
could be instantaneously transmitted, but service abroad could take more than
the thirty days allotted by the 1446(b) removal clock.66
Although it ended the courtesy copy removal trap, Murphy Brothers
neither expressly addressed nor decisively resolved other § 1446(b) issues that

60. Id.
61. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Apache Nitrogen Prods., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 674,
679 (D. Ariz. 1993)).
62. Id. at 354-55 (using the Seventh Circuit's inconsistent reading of the same language in
§ 1446(b) and rule 81(c) as a basis for undermining the Eleventh Circuit's position).
63. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c) provides, in relevant part:
In a removed action in which the defendant has not answered, the defendant
shall answer orpresent the other defenses or objections available under these
rules within 20 days after the receiptthroughservice or otherwise of a copy
of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for reliefupon which the action
or proceeding is based, or within 20 days after the service ofsummons upon
such initial pleading, then filed, or within 5 days after the filing of the
petition for removal, whichever period is longest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (c) (emphasis added).
64. Silva v. City of Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (7th Cir. 1995).
65. Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 355.
66. Id. at 356. This frequently invoked concern for foreign defendants is unwarranted
because foreign defendants, who are generally sophisticated, can just as instantaneously
communicate with and retain domestic counsel to protect their substantive and procedural rights.
Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,115 (1987) (suggesting courts should
exercise prudence before subjecting alien defendants to personal jurisdiction).
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divided the lower federal courts.67 However, its holding, buttressed by its
underlying policy rationale-that a defendant's substantive and procedural
rights may not be abridged absent the notice provided by a summons and the
information provided by a complaint-strongly suggested a proper resolution
of these other issues.6"
I.

OTHER SECTION 1446 PROBLEMS

A. Service on a Statutory Agent
If an action is commencedby substituted service of process 9 on a statutory
agent, does the time for removal run from the completion of service ofprocess

under state law,70 or from its receipt by the named defendant after transmission
by the statutory agent? Although older cases were divided on the question,71
with one notable exception,72 more recent cases both prior to73 and following74
Murphy Brothers, held that the § 1446(b) period is triggered by the named
defendant's receipt of the complaint.
These cases reached the correct result for two reasons. First, state law is
ordinarily disregarded when removal is considered, including state law

67. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
68. See Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 356.
69. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (7th ed. 1999) (defining substituted
service as "[a]ny method of service allowed by law in place of personal service, such as service
by mail-Also termed constructive service").

70. Ordinarily, service of process is complete under state law when the statutory agent is
served. See, e.g., Fidelity Funding, Inc. v. Pollution Research & Control Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:98CV-1691-P, 1999 WL 20955, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 1999) ("Under Texas state procedural law,
service is completewhen the Secretary of'Stateis served, notwhen a defendantreceives notice.");
Medina v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 519, 520 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that service
is complete underNew Yorkbusiness corporation law in civil actions when the Secretary ofState
has been served).
71. See, e.g., 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3732, at288 &n.10 (3d ed. 1998) (collecting and comparing older statutory agent service-ofprocess cases).
72. Bodden v. Union Oil Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 584, 588-89 (E.D. La. 1998).
73. See, e.g., Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. v. Hall, 14 F. Supp. 2d 988,991 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(stating that removal period begins on defendant's receipt ofprocess, not when service is made
on statutory agent); Skidway Assocs., Ltd. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 980,982 (D.S.C.
1990) (same). Cf.Fidelity Funding,Inc., 1999 WL 20955, at *2-*4 (holding removal period ran

from time defendant refused Secretary of State's transmission ofprocess, not when Secretary of
State received process).
74. See, e.g., Hibernia Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. U.S.E. Cmty. Servs. Group, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
2d 511, 511 (E.D. La. 2001) (refusing to followBodden); Auguste v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,

90 F. Supp. 2d 231,232-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating defendant can remove only after examining
the complaint); Baum v. Avado Brands, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:99-CV-0700G, 1999 WL 1034757,
at*2-*3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12,1999) (analyzing receipt by the defendant rule); 1015 HalfSt. Corp.
v. Warehouse Concepts, Inc.,No. Civ.A. 99-1174SS-I, 1999WL 1212885, at*1-*2 (D.D.C. Oct.
26,1999) (following majority rule); In rePfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 177,182-83
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding service on statutory agent is insufficientto triggerremoval period).
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technicalities for completing service of process and securing personal
jurisdiction.75 These issues can and should be raised after removal.76 Second,
without receipt of the complaint, a defendant cannot intelligently ascertain if
a case is removable. The notice ofremoval, which must be signed pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, must contain "a short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal."77 Only after receiving a copy of
the complaint can a defendant determine that proper grounds exist for removal.
A statutory agent's function is limited to accepting substituted service and
transmitting documents to the nonresident defendant. Obviously, a secretary
of state, insurance commissioner, or other statutory agent has no substantive
basis or authority to remove a case for the named defendant.7" Moreover, as
one court aptly noted, "the defendant's right to a federal forum ought not to
depend upon the rapidity and accuracy with which statutory agents inform their
principals of the commencement of litigation against them."79
Murphy Brothers, in which the defendant received the complaint before
service, adopted a service rule to end the courtesy copy removal trap.80 Its
holding requires either simultaneous service of a summons and complaint or
receipt of the complaint after and apart from official service of process before
the removal period begins.81 It prohibits receipt of the complaint unattended by
any formal service of process from starting the removal clock. 2 However, its
dicta plainly authorizes removal based on receipt of the complaint after official
service of process.83 This sequence of events--service followed by
receipt-generally occurs when service is made on a statutory agent.
Accordingly, Murphy Brothers' dicta, supported by its policy predicate that
procedural rights cannot be abridged without the information provided by a
complaint, manifestly require that removal run from receipt by the named
defendant and not from service on the statutory agent.

75. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 3732, at 290 & n.12 (collecting cases).
76. Id.§ 3738, at398-402 &n. 17. Defendants generally prefer to have objections to personal
jurisdiction and service ofprocess determined by a federal judge. Ifmotions to dismiss on these
grounds are asserted in the state court, the thirty-day removal period is likely to run before these
motions are decided. Accordingly, a defendant sued in a state court lacking personal jurisdiction
should remove and move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994).
78. See, e.g., Kurtz v. Harris, 245 F. Supp. 752, 754 (S.D. Tex. 1965) ("[T]he [thirty]-day
period permitted for removal under Section 1446(b) does notbegin until the defendant or his own
appointed agent actually receives process. Neither the Chairman nor the Secretary of State has
authority to remove."); see also Clark v. Wey, No. 92 Civ. 9179 (IBM), 1993 WL 313043, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,1993) (recognizing statutory agenthas no dutyotherthan forwardingprocess).
79. Cygielman v. Cunard Line, Ltd. 890 F. Supp. 305,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Although most
statutory agents promptly forward process to the named defendant, there have been occasional
long delays. See, e.g., Auguste, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (delay of twenty-four days).
80. Murphy Bros., Inc., v. Machetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 334, 347-48 (1999).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
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Interpreted in this light, current § 1441(b) adequately deals with the
statutory agent service issue. Nevertheless, the number of recent cases raising
5 plainly points to
the issue,"4 including cases decided after Murphy Brothers,"
the need for a definitive resolution of the issue by Congress. Additionally,
because Murphy Brothersendorsed a service over a receipt rule (when receipt
precedes service) a wooden reading of the case might lead a court to conclude
that service is always the triggering event. An amendment understandably
would prevent such a reading.
B. New York Summons and Notice
In New York, an action is commenced either by filing a summons and
complaint or a summons with notice.86 When the summons with notice is used
to commence an action, New York law currently provides that the summons,
or notice attached to the summons, shall state the nature of the action and the
relief sought, including the sum ofmoney for which judgment may be taken in
the event of default. 7 A defendant served with a summons and notice may
demand, within the time for an appearance,88 service of the complaint. 9 A
plaintiff has twenty days from service of the demand to serve the complaint."
In the absence of a demand, a plaintiffmust serve the complaint within twenty
days after service of a notice of appearance by a defendant.91 In either instance,
service of the complaint may be substantially delayed if the summons and
notice is used to commence an action.92
When an action is commenced by a summons with notice, is the removal
period triggered by the earlier service of the summons with notice, or by the
later service of the complaint? Not surprisingly this issue divided federal
district courts in New York both before 3 and after94 Murphy Brothers. The

84. See supra notes 72-73.
85. See supra note 74.
86. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304 (McKinney 2001). Service of the summons and complaint or the
summons with notice generally must be made within 120 days of filing. See id. 306-b.
87. See id. 305(b).
88. See id. 320.
89. Id. 3012(b).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196,199 (2d Cir. 2001) (overtwomonth delay); Rios v. New York Marriott Marquis, No. 01 Civ. 5536 (NRB), 2001 WL 863425,
at*1 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 2001) (over nine-month delay); Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. v. Diversified Info.
Techs., Inc. 133 F. Supp. 2d 197, 199-200 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (almost three-month delay).
93. See Am. Telecasting,Inc., 261 F.3d at 202-03.
94. Compare Rios, 2001 WL 863425, at *1-*2 (concluding that the removal clock began
with defendant's receipt ofthe summons and notice since defendant could ascertain removability
at the time), with Whitaker v. Fresno Telsat Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6059 (SAS), 1999 WL 767432, at
*1-*2 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 1999) (applying Murphy Bros., Inc. to start removal clock when
defendant received complaint).
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Second Circuit 95recently resolved this issue in Whitaker v. American
Telecasting,Inc.
Although Murphy Brothers uses the term "complaint" to refer to the
document asserting a claim, 96 § 1446(b) uses the phrase "the initial pleading
setting forth the claim for relief."97 The term "initial pleading" is more
inclusive and applies to any document-whether denominated "complaint,"
"petition,"9 8 or any other term under state law-providing notice ofthe claims
against a defendant.
In Whitaker, the Second Circuit succinctly summarized the reasoning of
those district courts holding that only the complaint can constitute an initial
pleading under § 1446(b):
These courts have rejected the notion that a summons with
notice can constitute the initial pleading because: (a) the
summons with notice is not defined as a pleading under
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3011; (b) the notice has no legal effect under
New York law except in cases of default; and (c) the
legislative history of section 1446(b) appears to point to
service of the complaint alone as the relevant event for
triggering the removal period. 99
These reasons seem persuasive at first blush, but when measured against the
policies underlying the removal statute, they place form over substance. The
essential function of the "initial pleading" is to provide notice of the claims
against a defendant."° In the removal context, the initial pleading must provide
sufficient information for a defendant to determine that a case is removable.
Under current New York practice, a summons with notice generally contains
this information.'' Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that a summons
with notice may constitute an initial pleading under §1446(b)." 2 This
conclusion is sound because it recognized that the information provided, and
not the document's denomination under state law, is crucial for determining
removability. Moreover, a defendant may not always be able to determine

95. Am. Telecasting,Inc., 261 F.3d at 206.
96. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
98. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304 (McKinney 2001) ("A special proceeding is commenced
by filing a notice of petition or order to show cause and a petition.").
99. Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting,Inc., 261 F.3d 196,202-03 (2d. Cir. 2001).
100. See id. at 204 ("The legislative history reflects a clear concern for ensuring that a
defendant'know[s] what the suit is about' before triggering the removal clock.") (quoting Murphy
Bros., Inc. v. Machetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 334, 352 (1999)).
101. See id.("Because the summons with notice generally provides information from which
a defendant can ascertain removability, this document is often consistent with the 1949
Congressional conception of an initial pleading.").
102. Id. ("[Summons and notice] may constitute an initial pleading for purposes of the
federal removal statute.").
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removability from even a state court complaint. Frequently, state court
complaints omit information regarding citizenship, principal place ofbusiness,
and the amount in controversy, all of which may be crucial for determining
diversityjurisdiction. "3° The receipt ofany document under state law providing
sufficient information to determine if a case is removable, triggers the
defendant's time to remove, provided that formal service of process precedes
or accompanies the document."' This view is bolstered by the traditional
policy favoring removal sooner rather than later. Parties must know which
court to go to for emergency or other initial pretrial relief.
The Second Circuit's resolution of this issue is not likely to be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. The summons-with-notice procedure is apparently
unique to New York, and the Second Circuit has ruled that a summons with
notice can constitute an initial pleading for purposes of starting the removal
clock. 5 Therefore, the issue appears settled and there is no need for a specific
amendment to § 1446(b). However, New York is the world's most important
financial center, media and entertainment capital, and commercial trade zone.
Consequently, its courts generate an enormous volume oflitigation particularly
involving corporate, financial, entertainment, and intellectual property law.
Notwithstanding Whitaker's sound resolution of the issue, the post-Murphy
Brothers split in district court authority' suggests lingering doubt and
reasonable differences of opinion. Consequently, since this Article proposes a
major revision to § 1446(b), Congress should definitively resolve the issue.
Although the summons-with-notice procedure affects only New York, the issue
of what constitutes an initial pleading is a national problem. 7

103. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 8, § 3723, at 568-69; 14C WRIGHTuTAL., supra
note 71, § 3725, at 79-80.
104. Acknowledging the difficulty in determining what constitutes an initial pleading for
purposes of removal, one leading treatise concluded:
Given the pervasive anti-removalperspective, doubts as to what constitutes
an initial pleading should be resolved in favor of an earlier filing of the
notice ofremoval. Given the furtherpervasive anti-diversity perspective, it
is entirely likely that what constitutes an initial pleading in a diversity case
is different, and perhaps less formal, than an initial pleading in a federal
question case.
16 MOORE -TAL., supra note 6, §107.30[3][b], at 179 (footnote omitted). If a pre-complaint
pleading, such as a motion for a temporary restraining order or other extraordinary relief,
establishes abasis forremoval, ithas beenheld to triggerthe time forremoval._d.; accordDublin
Worldwide Prods. (USA), Inc. v. Jam Theatricals, Ltd., 162 F. Supp. 2d 275,277-78 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding a pre-action order to show cause seeking discovery in aid of an action triggered
removal); cf. Sprague v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 206, 208-09 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding
a summons and civil action cover sheet with insufficient information to show diversity and amount
in controversy did not constitute an initial pleading).
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 94.
107. See, e.g., supranote 104 & infranote 145 (collecting cases and authorities discussing
removability ofcases commenced by a summons and other documents apart from a complaint).
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C. Multiple-DefendantActions
All pertinent sections of the removal statute contemplate cases with more
than one defendant, except for § 1446(b)."0 8 This conspicuous omission has
created the most serious statutory construction problem when removal is sought
in multidefendant actions. It has also generated a substantial volume of
scholarly commentary, mostly critical of the approach adopted by the Fifth
Circuit to solve the problem."0 9 Most significantly, this omission causes the
§ 1446(b) problem least susceptible to judicial resolution, even in the wake of
Murphy Brothers.
Three possible interpretations of § 1446(b)'s timing provision have
emerged from the lower federal courts. They are the first-served"0 and lastserved"' defendant rules, which require the removal period to run
1
simultaneously for all served defendants, and the individual-defendant rule, 2
which requires the period to run separately for each defendant served.

108. Compare28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) ("afterreceiptby the defendant"), with 28 U.S.C.
§1441(a) (1994) ("by the defendant or the defendants"), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) ("without
regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties" and "only if none of the parties"), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a) (1994) ("defendant or defendants"), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (1994) ("all proper parties"),
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)(1994) ("to join additional defendants"), 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1994) ("any one
or more of the defendants" and "any defendant"). Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994) (permitting
removal of a separate and independent claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 if "joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims on causes of action," and contemplating both multiclaim and
multidefendant actions). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d) (1994) (applying to multidefendant actions
against a foreign state and other defendants although drafted in the singular).
109. See, e.g., 14C WRIGHTETAL., supra note 71, § 3732, at 336-41 (criticizing the firstserved defendantrule); C. Todd Hagins, Sandsin an Hourglass:SolvingthePuzzle ofTimeLimits
for Removal to FederalCourt, 68 DEF. CouNs.J. 421,423-31 (2001) (advocating aMcKinneyBrierly type of last-served defendant rule); Derek S. Hollingsworth, Comment, Section 1446:
Remedying theFifth Circuit'sRemoval Trap, 49 BAYLORL. REv. 157,168-72 (1997) (criticizing
Fifth Circuit authority upholding a first-served defendant rule); Wiseman, supranote 15, at 33035, 349 (criticizing first-served rule and proposing a type of last-served defendant rule).
The student commentator last cited would not permit an earlier-served defendant to initiate
removal after its individual thirty-day period ran, but would permit an earlier-served defendant to
join in a later-served defendant's notice of removal. See id. at 349. The removal statute only
provides for a defendant to file a notice ofremoval. It does not authorize a defendant's joining in
or consenting to another defendant's notice ofremoval. See id. The inherent defect in § 1446(b),
which only contemplates a single defendant case, is the obvious reason for this lack of authority.
Because the effect of consenting or joining in a later-served defendant's removal notice is the
same as if the statute permitted the earlier-served defendant to file its own notice ofremoval after
the expiration of its time for removal, this Article draws no distinction between the procedures,
and proposes a true last-served defendant rule under which the time for removal of served
defendants runs until the expiration of the latest ending thirty-dayperiod calculated separately for
each defendant. See infra Parts III.C. & IV.
110. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit articulated the first-served defendant rule in Brown v.
Demco, Inc.,"' and reiterated and refined it in Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance
Company of North America."4 When a complaint names more than one
defendant, and all defendants are served before removal is attempted, the
thirty-day period runs simultaneously for all defendants from the first date on
which any defendant is served. Assume a complaint names two defendants, A
and B, and is filed in a state court on November 30 of a particular year. A is
served on December 1 andB is served on December 10. A's thirty-day period
to remove expires on December 31. If B were sued separately, B would have
until January 9 to remove, but because B was named as a defendant along with
A, B must also remove by December 31. Under these facts, B has nine fewer
days to remove than § 1446(b) would allow in a single defendant action. The
result under this hypothetical is unfortunate but raises only mild fairness
concerns. Suppose instead of being served on December 10, B is served on
December 31. Now B's time to remove under the first-served defendant rule is
cut to hours or minutes, or perhaps is eliminated altogether if service is made
on a statutory agent or B's designated agent for service of process. The agent
is not likely to transmit the complaint to B until after the removal time for A
has run. Similarly, B's right to remove would be eliminated if B were served
after December 31."'
Disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit's approach, the Fourth Circuit in
McKinney v. Board of Trustees held that § 1446(b)'s removal clock runs
separately for each defendant." 6 If one applies McKinney to the hypothetical
above, A would have until December 31, and B would have until January 9 to
remove. However, ifA failed to remove by December 31, B's right to remove
would be eliminated." 7 The Fourth Circuit supported its separate-defendant
rule on four grounds. First, it found fault with Getty Oil'sfirst-served defendant

113. 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986). Brown was particularly inappropriate for
articulating a first-served defendant rule because the case, removable by the original defendants,
was pending for over four years in the state courtbefore the plaintifffiled an amended complaint
naming a new defendant. See id.at 480. This added defendant promptly removed. Id.Hearing an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of remand, holding that a first-served defendant may waive removal for
subsequently served defendants and concluding that its holding "follows logically from the
unanimity requirement, the thirty-day time limit, and the fact that a defendantmay waive removal
by proceeding in state court." Id. at 482.
114. 841 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1988).
115. Thehypothetical presented by service on a second defendantnear or after the thirty-day
deadline, mightjustify an exceptional-circumstances exception to the first-served defendant rule,
even in the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1263 n.12; Brown, 792 F.2d at 482; White v. White, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 890,893-94 (W.D. La. 1998). Butsee Hagins,supra note 108, at425 (quoting Prescott
v. Memorial Med. Ctr.-Livingston, No. 9:00 CV-0025, 2000 WL 532035, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
25,2000)) (implying that exceptional circumstances are rarely found, and are never found in the
Fifth Circuit).
116. 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992).
117. See id.at 926 n.3 ("[I]f A does not petition for removal within 30 days, the case may
not be removed.") (citation omitted).
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rule, which in effect inserted the word "first" before the word "defendant" in
§ 1446(b),"1 8 because the statute only contemplates one defendant." 9 Second,
the court disagreed with Getty's Oil's policy justification for the first-served
defendant rule; the Fifth Circuit believed that its rule promoted unanimity
among defendants, but the Fourth Circuit felt the rule promoted inequity by
"establishing one fixed deadline for defendants served as much as thirty days
apart."' 20 Third, responding to the policy concern that plaintiffs are entitled to
know at the earliest possible time whether their case will proceed in state or
federal court, the court stated that plaintiffs can limit the time for removal by
serving all defendants at or about the same time.' In addition, the court
believed that § 1446(b) balances a plaintiff's right to an early determination of
the forum with a defendant's right to a federal forum."z The Fourth Circuit is
undoubtedly correct that the first-served defendant rule unfairly shifts this
balance in favor of plaintiffs. Fourth, noting that § 1446(a) was amended after
Getty Oil to make Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable
to removal notices, the court was concerned that under the first-served
defendant rule, "later served defendants will either have to forego removal or
join hurriedly in a petition for removal and face possible Rule 11 sanctions."'"
Although the Fourth Circuit's individual-defendant rule is inherently more
fair than the Fifth Circuit's first-served defendant rule, it potentially allows an
earlier-served defendant to cut off entirely a later-served defendant's right to
remove. IfA, in our hypothetical, fails to timely remove, B cannot remove even
if B's separate thirty-day period has not expired. This result has been justified
by the removal statute's unanimity requirement. 24 All defendants must agree
to remove because § 1446(a) states that "[A] defendant
or defendants desiring
125
to remove ...shall file.., a notice of removal."'
However, neither § 1446(a) nor § 1446(b) contemplates a scenario in
which defendants are served as much as thirty days apart, or in which an
unsophisticated defendant is served first and a more sophisticated defendant is
served later. In these instances, the second-served defendant should be able to
timely remove and persuade the first-served defendant to join the removal.

118. Id. at 927.
119. Seeid. at 926.
120. Id. at 926-27
121. Id. at 927.
122. See McKinney, 955 F.2d at 927-28.
123. Id. at 928.
124. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994) ("defendant or defendants"); Getty Oil Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1988) ("This rule... promotes unanimity
among the defendants without placing undue hardships on subsequently served defendants.")
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986)
("The rule follows logically from the unanimity requirement"); 16 MooRE ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 107.30[3][a] [i], at 161 ("[T]he failure of the first-served defendantto file aremovalnotice within
30 days of service prevents all subsequently served from later removing the action. ...[, a
principle] predicated on the 'unanimity rule."').
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994).
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Otherwise, the first-served defendant abridges the second-served defendant's
procedural right to a federal forum. If the first-served defendant makes a
conscious choice not to remove, the second-served defendant has to accept that
choice. But the second-served defendant should have a reasonable opportunity
to consult with the first-served defendant regarding possible removal.
Consultation is practically impossible if service on the second defendant occurs
near the end of or after the first defendant's thirty-day removal period has
expired.
In Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.'26 the Sixth Circuit
permitted alater-served defendant to remove after an earlier-served defendant's
time to remove had expired and allowed the earlier-served defendant to join in
the later defendant's timely removal. 27 The court recognized that its case was
factually distinguishable from McKinney because
the earlier-served defendants in McKinney had a valid
petition for removal pending at the time the later-served
defendantjoined in the removal petition, whereas the earlierserved defendant in the case at bar had failed in its attempts
to remove the case when the later-served defendant filed a
new removal petition.s
Without analyzing whether the factual distinctions were sufficiently material
to compel a different result, the Sixth Circuit precipitously concluded that "the
policy considerations articulated by the Fourth Circuit inMcKinney are equally
applicable to the facts before this court.""2 9 It then held that "a later-served
defendant has 30 days from the date of service to remove... with the consent
of the remaining defendants. 1 3' This holding is unremarkable and materially
indistinguishable from McKinney. It endorses, without directly saying so, the
individual or separate-defendant rule.
In a footnote tacked to the conclusion of its § 1446(b) analysis, the Sixth
Circuit provided some support for a true last-served defendant rule. The court
recognized that its holding raises the issue whether an earlier-served defendant,
who attempts but fails to remove within its own thirty-day period, may join in
the timely removal of a later-served defendant.' It concluded that the earlierserved defendant may do so.132 The first-served defendant's intent and desire

126. 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999).
127. See id. at 530-33.
128. Id. at 533.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at533 n.3.
132. Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 n.3 (citing Freeman v. Bechtel, 936 F. Supp. 320, 325-26
(M.D.N.C. 1996) ("holding first-served defendants could consent to later-served defendant's
removal despite having already waived theirright to removal"). Butsee Holder v. City ofAtlanta,
925 F. Supp. 783, 785 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ('holding that later-served defendants cannot obtain
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to remove were manifested during its own thirty-day removal period inBrierly.
Nevertheless, in allowing removal, the Sixth Circuit provided tacit support for
a true last-served defendant rule.
Suppose hypothetically that a first-served defendant simply fails to remove
for no apparent reason. Should such a defendant be permitted to join in the
timely removal of a later-served defendant? If a court permits removal in this
situation, its opinion would constitute direct authority for a true last-served
defendant rule.'33
The lower federal courts are deeply divided over the proper application of
§ 1446(b) to multidefendant cases. In denying certiorari in Brierly, the
Supreme Court avoided an opportunity to resolve the existing conflict among
the circuits.' A future case may allow for a resolution. Nevertheless, as both
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits aptly recognized, § 1446(b) contemplates only a
single defendant.'35 Accordingly, unless Congress amends the statute to take
account ofmultidefendant cases, the lower federal courts are likely to continue
to be hopelessly split. Any single case is unlikely to raise all the permutations
possible in complex multiparty litigation.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION

1446

A. History
Since 1948, § 1446(b) has provided a uniform time period for removal of
civil actions. Under the 1948 version of the statute, a civil action had to be
removed "within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of
process, whichever is later."' 3 s This language proved unworkable because
different states commenced actions by different methods, particularly New
York and Kentucky, which did not require (and in the case of New York, still
does not require) the complaint to accompany service of process.' 37 A New
York defendant might not have had access to the complaint until after the

consent from defendants who failed to remove within their own thirty-day period"); Scialo v.
Scala Pacing Co., 821 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("refusing to allow later-served
defendants whose petition to remove had failed because of noncompliance with § 1446(b) to
consent to first-served defendant's petition for removal")).
133. Cf.Freeman,936 F. Supp. at322 (noting later-removing defendant was the Secretary
of Agriculture asserting a federal question).
134. See 528 U.S. 1076 (2000) (denying cert. to Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging,
Inc., 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999)).
135. SeeBrierly, 184 F.3d at 532; McKinney v. Bd. ofTrustees, 955 F.2d 924,926 (4th Cir.
1992).
136. 16 MOORE ETAL., supranote 6, § 107App.01 [1], at 3 (providing text of 1948 version
of§ 1446(b)).
137. See id. § 107App.02[2], at 12. See also KY. R. CIv. P. 4.01(1)(a) & (b) (embodying a
revision that now requires simultaneous service of the summons and complaint); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
305(b) (McKinney 2001) (providing that the summons and notice procedure commences an
action).
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twenty-day period expired. Consequently, § 1446(b) was amended in 1949
essentially to its current form to correct that and other more minor problems.'38
Congress enlarged the removal period to thirty days in 1965.139
B. CurrentStatute
In relevant part, § 1446 currently provides as follows:
Section 1446. Procedure for Removal.
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil
action or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in
the district court of the United States for the district and
division within which such action is pending a notice of
removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of
the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process,
pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or
defendants in such action.1"
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding
shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which
such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after
the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be
served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable, except that a case may
not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by
section 1332 of this title4 more than 1 year after
commencement of the action.1 '

138. 16 MooRE ETAL., supra note 6, § 107App.02[2], at 12-13.
139. Id. § 107App.05[2], at 17-18.

140. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994).
141. Id. § 1446(b).
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C. ProposedAmendment
1. Section 1446(a)
Congress should amend § 1446(a) by inserting the following clause after
the word "removal," and before the word "together":
including the basis for the court's jurisdiction and compliance with
subsection (b) below.
This change clarifies the defendant's obligation to establish federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition, it requires the defendant to show
procedural compliance with the timing provision of § 1446(b). By requiring a
defendant to certify compliance with § 1446(b), the proposed amendment will
help avoid litigation over this troublesome issue and will assist a court in
resolving a dispute if remand is sought for untimely removal.
2. Section 1446(b)
Congress should amend § 1446(b) by repealing the current statute and
enacting the following language in its place:
(b)(1)(A) When a civil action orproceeding is commenced in a state
court by the service on the defendant of the summons together with the
initialpleading settingforth the claim for relief,the notice of removal
shallbe filed within thirty days after such service on the defendant.
(B) When a civil action or proceedingis commenced in a state court
by the service of the summons without the initialpleadingsettingforth the
claim for relief, but the summons, or other document served with the
summons, contains sufficient informationfrom which the defendant may
ascertain if the case is removable, the notice of removal shall be filed
within thirty days after service of the summons, or summons and other
document.
(C) When a civil action orproceedingis commenced by service ofthe
summons without the initialpleadingsettingforth the claimfor relief,and
such initialpleadingis not requiredto befiled in the state court,the notice
of removal shall be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise,of a copy of the initialpleadingsettingforth
the claimfor relief
(D) When a civil action orproceedingis commenced by service ofthe
summons without the initialpleadingsettingforth the claimfor relief,and
such initialpleadingis requiredto befiled in the state court after service
of the summons, the notice ofremoval shall be filed within thirty days of
the date on which the initialpleading is filed in the state court, or is
received by the defendant after service, whichever periodis shorter.
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(E)When a civil action orproceedingis commenced by service ofthe
summons without the initialpleadingsettingforththe claimfor relief,but
such initialpleadingis requiredto befiled in the state courtbefore service
ofthe summons, the notice ofremoval shall befiled within thirty days after
the service ofthe summons.
(F) When a civil action or proceedingis commenced in a state court
by service ofprocess on a statutory agent, the notice ofremoval shall be
filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant ofa copy ofthe initial
pleading settingforth the claimfor relief
(b)(2) If a case statedby the initialpleading in a state court is not
removable,a notice ofremovalmay befiled within thirty days after receipt
by the defendant, or, ifthere is more than one defendant, by each
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order, or other paperfrom which it may first be
ascertainedthatthe case is one which is or has become removable, except
thata case may not be removed on the basis ofjurisdictionconferredby
section 1332 of this title more than I year after commencement of the
action.
(b)(3) (A) Exceptforremoval undersection 1441(c), ifa civil action or
proceeding is commenced in a state court against more than one
defendant, the thirty-day periodfor filing a notice of removal shall be
determinedseparatelyforeach served-defendantundersubsection (b)(1),
and each served-defendantmustfile a separateremoval notice, orjoin in
apreviouslyorsubsequentlyfiledremoval notice, within the timeprovided
by the separatethirty-dayperiod ending latest.
(B) If an action is removed byfewer than all defendantsprior to the
commencement of the thirty-day period under subsection (b)(1) for any
defendant,further service on, and objections to removal by, unserved
defendantsshall be made and determinedunder section 1448.
D. Statutory Notesfor Section 1446(b)
The proposed amendment to § 1446(b) codifies the holding and dicta in
Murphy Brothers and resolves the statutory agent, New York summons with
notice, and multidefendant problems discussed above."
Section (b)(1)(A) codifies the principal dictum in Murphy Brothers "that
a named defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service ofthe
summons and complaint."' 43 This statement was technically dictumbecause the
defendant in Murphy Brothers received a courtesy copy of the complaint prior
to formal service.'" The actual holding of Murphy Brothers is that receipt of

142. See supra Part Ill.

143. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999).
144. Id. at348.
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a complaint prior to service of process does not start the § 1446(b) removal

clock.
Section (b)(1)(B) resolves the New York summons with notice problem.
It should also solve problems occuning in other states that permit
commencement of an action by summons alone, when the summons, or other
document served with the summons, provides sufficient information for a
defendant to ascertain that a case is removable. 45
Sections (b)(1)(C), (D)and (E) codify the three categories of state service
laws, other than simultaneous service of the summons and complaint,
summarized in Murphy Brothers.'"
Section (b)(1)(F) resolves the statutory agent problem.
Section (b)(2) is the second paragraph of current § 1446(b), which
concerns removal when a case commenced in a state court is not initially
removable. It contains a minor amendment to reflect the changes in proposed
section (b)(3), covering multiple defendants. The proposal adds the words, "or,
if there is more than one defendant, by each defendant," after the word
"defendant" to codify current law that each defendant in a multidefendant
action that becomes removable subsequent to initial commencement mustjoin
in the removal. 47 In a pending case all originally joined and served defendants
will likely receive at or about the same time "a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable."' 48 Consequently, the problems
encountered in initially filed multidefendant cases are not likely to be
encountered in cases that become removable later. However, the proposed
amendment provides that each defendant has thirty days to file a notice of
removal from receipt of the document that first establishes removability.
Additionally, defendants in pending cases are likely to communicate with each
other on a regular basis, ensuring prompt consideration of removal.
Section (b)(3)(A) resolves the multidefendant problem specifically for
initially-filed cases. In this type of case, plaintiffs have substantial
opportunities for tactical maneuvering aimed at thwarting defendants' removal
rights. The proposal adopts a true last-served defendant rule. Each defendant
has until the end of the latest ending thirty-day period calculated separately for
each defendant. If a defendant's separate thirty-day period has not commenced
because none of the triggering events in section (b)(1) have occurred for that

145. See, e.g., Sprague v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 206,208 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing
Third Circuit authority thatpermits removal ifdocuments, which are later filed with pleadings, are
served with the summons, and provide adequate notice of federal jurisdiction). The court noted
that Murphy Brothersdid not consider this issue. See id. at 208. See generally 16 MOORE ETAL.,
supranote 6, § 107.30[3] [a] [iv] [A. 1], at 173-74 (discussing whether cases initiated by summons
and other documents, including correspondence among attorneys can trigger the thirty-day

requirement).
146. See Murphy Brothers, 526 U.S. at 354.
147. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss2/3

24

Stravitz: Recocking the Removal Trigger

2002]

RECOCKING THE REMOVAL TRIGGER

defendant, the case may be removed without that defendant. Current § 1448
provides for service of process on, and remand motions by, defendants served
after removal.
Fourmainreasons support the proposal ofatrue last-served defendant rule.
First, the current statutory language is perverted by the Fifth Circuit's firstserved defendant rule, which potentially thwarts the procedural rights of laterserved defendants. 149 Second, although the Fourth Circuit's individual-served
defendant rule in McKinney is less troublesome, it may nevertheless permit
abridgement oflater-serveddefendants' procedural rights. When aplaintifffirst
serves an unsophisticated defendant not likely to remove and waits until that
defendant's thirty-day period is almost expired to serve a sophisticated
defendant who is likely to remove, the latter-served defendant's
removal right
150
is vitiated if the earlier-served defendant fails to remove.
Third, a true last-served defendant rule provides opportunities for
consultation by all served defendants, which would allow a later-served
defendant an opportunity to persuade an earlier-served defendant whose thirtyday period expired to join in the removal. Fourth, only a true last-served
defendant rule adequately protects a later-served defendant's procedural rights
from abridgement prior to service of process and receipt of the complaint.
However, by adopting this proposal, Congress may significantly enlarge
the time for removal in multi-defendant actions. In states, including New
York,"' that have statutes or rules analogous to Rule 4(m) ofthe Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which requires service of the summons and complaint on
all named defendants within 120 days after the filing, 52 the period for removal
could be extended to a maximum of 151 days. A plaintiff has 120 days from
the date of filing to effectuate service on all defendants. If day one is the day
of filing, day 121 is the 120th day after filing. Thus, day 121 is the last day on
which a plaintiff can serve process on a defendant or otherwise trigger the
commencement of the thirty-day removal period under proposed section (b)(1).
A defendant has thirty days from the triggering event to remove, i.e., day 151.
The time period can be compressed if a plaintiff serves all defendants at or
about the same time. The true last-served defendant rule proposed here

149. See supranotes 113-15 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text. But see White v. White, 32 F. Supp.
2d 890, 893-94 (W.D. La. 1998) (finding exceptional circumstances inplaintiff's attempted forum
manipulationby serving, beforeMurphyBrotherswas decided, an unsophisticated defendantwith
a courtesy copy ofthe complaintmore than thirty days prior to serving the second defendant, who
promptly removed).
151. SeeN.Y. C.P.L.L 306-b (McKinney200I) (120 days).AccordALAsKAR. Civ.P. (4)(i)
(120 days); ARiz. 1L CrV. P. (4)(i) (120 days); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0706) (120 days). Other states
have shorter periods to effectuate service. See MASS. IL Civ. P. (4)G) (ninety days); Mo. R. Civ.
P. 54.21 (thirty days which canbe extendedto ninety days by courtorder);N.C.R.Civ.P.4(c) (60
days). Still other states provide slightly longerperiods. See IDAHOR. CIV.P. 4(a)(2) (six months);
OHio Civ. R. 4(e) (six months). But see S.C. P. CIV. P. 4 (no stated limit).
152. See FED. R. Civ.P. 4 (m) (1994). For good cause shown, a court may extend the 120
day period. Id.
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encourages a plaintiff to accomplish service on all defendants as soon as
possible after filing. Simultaneous or near simultaneous service will prevent,
or at least discourage, tactical maneuvering to prevent removal, which has been
a problem under the current statute.
In our simple hypothetical, assume again that the Plaintiff files on
November 30 and serves Defendant A on December 1. If this case were only
against A, A would have to remove by December 31. Let us assume further that
the initial complaint also names Defendant B and that Plaintiff cannot effect
service on Defendant B until March 31 of the following year, 120 days after
filing the complaint. Defendant B has thirty days to remove, or until April 30.
Under the Fifth Circuit's first-served defendant rule, removal would be
impossible, unless Defendant A contacted and persuaded Defendant B to join
in the removal prior to December 31. Also, if Defendant A failed to remove by
December 31, under the Fifth Circuit's rule, Defendant B's procedural right to
remove would be vitiated.
Under the Fourth Circuit's individual-defendant approach, Defendant B
would have the same amount of time to remove as Defendant A has under the
proposed true last-served defendant rule, because each defendant's removal
time is calculated separately. However, if Defendant A failed to remove by
December 31, Defendant B's right to remove would be cut off. Accordingly,
the only rule that balances plaintiff-oriented policies of unanimity and
timelessness with a defendant's procedural right to remove is the true lastserved defendant rule proposed above.
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 1446(b) was last substantially revised over fifty-two years ago in
1949. The lower federal courts have been hopelessly divided, both before and
after Murphy Brothers,when applying its removal timing provision, especially
in multi-defendant cases."5 3 Accordingly, the only way to end this division and
the time-consuming, expensive litigation it generates, is for Congress to recock
the § 1446(b) removal trigger in the manner proposed.

153. As of February 11,2002, federal courts have decided 2,402 cases involving § 1446(b)
issues since 1948, according to Westlaw KeyCite.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss2/3

26

